Neural Mechanisms Underlying Paradoxical Performance for Monetary Incentives Are Driven by Loss Aversion  by Chib, Vikram S. et al.
Neuron
ArticleNeural Mechanisms Underlying Paradoxical
Performance for Monetary Incentives
Are Driven by Loss Aversion
Vikram S. Chib,1,2,* Benedetto De Martino,3,4 Shinsuke Shimojo,1,2 and John P. O’Doherty2,3
1Division of Biology
2Computation and Neural Systems
3Division of Humanities and Social Sciences
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA
4Psychology and Language Sciences, University College of London, London WC1H 0AP, UK
*Correspondence: vchib@caltech.edu
DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.02.038Open access under CC BY license.SUMMARY
Employers often make payment contingent on
performance in order to motivate workers. We used
fMRI with a novel incentivized skill task to examine
the neural processes underlying behavioral re-
sponses to performance-based pay. We found that
individuals’ performance increased with increasing
incentives; however, very high incentive levels led
to the paradoxical consequence of worse perfor-
mance. Between initial incentive presentation and
task execution, striatal activity rapidly switched
between activation and deactivation in response
to increasing incentives. Critically, decrements in
performance and striatal deactivations were directly
predicted by an independent measure of behavioral
loss aversion. These results suggest that incentives
associated with successful task performance are
initially encoded as a potential gain; however, when
actually performing a task, individuals encode the
potential loss that would arise from failure.INTRODUCTION
It is generally assumed that an increase in financial incentive
provided for work will result in greater performance (Lazear,
2000). The reasoning behind this idea is that larger incentives
increase a worker’s motivation, which, in turn, elicits improved
behavioral output and performance. However, recent behavioral
experiments suggest a more idiosyncratic interplay between
incentives and performance (Ariely et al., 2009): when executing
skilled tasks, individuals’ performance increases as the level
of incentive increases only up to a point, after which greater
incentives become detrimental to performance. Despite the
ubiquity of performance-based incentive schemes in the
workforce, the neural and psychological underpinnings of
the relationship between incentives and performance are not
well understood.582 Neuron 74, 582–594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.Although the relationship between financial incentives and
performance has received limited investigation, the paradoxical
relationship between arousal and performance has long been
reported in the psychological literature (Baumeister, 1984;
Martens and Landers, 1970; Wood and Hokanson, 1965; Yerkes
and Dodson, 1908). Keeping in mind that arousal is closely asso-
ciated with motivation, behavioral economics has borrowed
theories from psychology to explain incentive based decrements
(Ariely et al., 2009; Camerer et al., 2005).
These psychological theories attempt to provide explanations
as to why external stressors such as presence of an audience or
social stereotypes might have detrimental effects on behavioral
performance—commonly termed ‘‘choking under pressure’’
(Baumeister, 1984; Beilock et al., 2004). A number of theories
have been proposed to account for the choking phenomenon,
including distraction theories and explicit monitoring theories.
Distraction theories propose that pressure creates a distracting
environment that shifts attentional focus to task-irrelevant
cues, such as worries about the situation and its consequences
(Beilock and Carr, 2001; Lewis and Linder, 1997; Wine, 1971). In
contrast, explicit monitoring theories suggest that the presence
of a stressor acts to wrest control of behavior from a habit-based
instrumental system involved in the implementation of skilled
motor acts, to a more goal-directed instrumental system in
which actions must be selected in a deliberative manner
(requiring on-going monitoring of performance) (Baumeister,
1984; Beilock and Carr, 2001; Beilock et al., 2004; Langer and
Imber, 1979).
At the neural level, very little is known about the
mechanisms underpinning performance decrements in stressful
environments. Mobbs et al. (2009) found that the degree
of subjects’ midbrain activation during a challenging task
was correlated with their performance decrement for large
incentives. They interpreted this neural response as an ‘‘over-
motivation’’ signal for the high rewards associated with success-
ful task performance.
Another region known to play an important role in mediating
interactions between rewards and motor performance is the
ventral striatum. A number of studies have found this region to
be involved in mediating the effects of rewards on increases in
motor performance (Kurniawan et al., 2010; Pessiglione et al.,
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Figure 1. The Incentive-Based Motor Task
(A) At the beginning of each trial participants
were presented with the incentive (e.g., Win $50)
for which they were playing. During incentive
presentation, to initiate the motor task, partici-
pants placed their white hand cursor in the start
position (X) for a random amount of time (2–5 s).
During the task, a target (,) appeared that was
registered to a position 20 cm distal from the start.
To successfully achieve the task, participants had
to place their hand cursor and a mass cursor into
the target within 2 s, while achieving a final velocity
below 0.02 m/s. At the end of the trial they were
shown a message indicating the outcome of
their performance. In the case that a participant
successfully placed the spring-mass in the target,
a positive message was displayed (’’You Won
$50’’); otherwise, the participant was informed of
her negative outcome (‘‘You Lost’’).
(B) The spring-mass task provided us with a well
defined dynamic system. The control input of the
system was (rh) the position of the hand. Thus
movements of the hand resulted in oscillations of
the mass cursor. These equations assumed a zero
rest length of the spring. We defined M0 = 3 kg
and K0 = 120 Nm
1. The state equations for the
system were integrated in real-time to compute
the instantaneous position of the object for each
corresponding position of the hand. Reaching
movements were always initiated with the hand
and object both at rest at the same position. As the
participant began to move her hand the mass
cursor would begin to oscillate. Because the
dynamics of the task were completely novel to
participants they had to learn what hand move-
ments would result in controlled movements of
the mass cursor.
(C and D) After training participants executed
bimodal hand velocity profiles (C) to achieve
smooth bell-shaped velocity profiles of the
mass cursor (D). This allowed the participant
to direct both the hand and mass cursors into
the target.
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Mechanisms Underlying Performance for Incentives2007; Schmidt et al., 2008). The ventral striatum has been impli-
cated in interactions between a Pavlovian system in which
reflexive conditioned responses come to be elicited by a stimulus
that predicts the subsequent delivery of a reward, and an instru-
mental system in which actions are selected flexibly in order to
increase the probability of obtaining reward (Bray et al., 2008;
Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Talmi et al., 2008). In Pavlovian
to instrumental transfer, instrumental responding for reward
can be enhanced as a result of the presence of a reward predict-
ing Pavlovian stimulus, an effect that is abolished in rodents
following lesions of the ventral striatum (Corbit and Balleine,
2005). Furthermore, fMRI studies of humans have revealed
activity in the ventral striatum during Pavlovian-to-instrumental
transfer (Bray et al., 2008; Talmi et al., 2008). All of the above
studies have focused on the role of ventral striatum in mediating
enhancements in responding, as opposed to decrements. Incontrast, in this study we aimed to investigate the role of the
ventral striatum in mediating response decrements as a function
of large incentives.
To this end, we used a novel motor control paradigm in
conjunction with functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI). Participants performed the highly-skilled motor task
of controlling a virtual spring-mass system (Figure 1B). This
dynamic system was chosen because it was completely novel
to participants, and thus allowed us to evaluate performance
uncorrupted by participants’ previous experiences or expertise
(Dingwell et al., 2002). During trials participants moved both their
hand and the mass from a start position to a target 20 cm away.
A successful trial consisted of both the hand and mass being
placed in the target, subject to velocity constraints.
The experiment took place on two consecutive days. On the
first day of the experiment, participants trained on 500 repeatedNeuron 74, 582–594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 583
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Figure 2. Behavioral Performance during
Training
Training performance represented as the
percentage of successful trials computed across
participants, for each trial number. Gray dashed
lines indicate the beginning of each session of
training. The bar graph represents the group mean
of the first and last 10 trials of training. A significant
increase in performance was seen after training
(****p < 0.0001).
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Mechanisms Underlying Performance for Incentivestrials with the spring-mass system. After training, we determined
participants’ rates of success at various target sizes. This thresh-
olding allowed us to tailor standard difficulty levels for each
participant. On the second day, participants performed the
testing phase and were scanned with fMRI while they controlled
the spring-mass system with the purpose of obtaining reward.
While in the magnet, on Day 2 of the experiment, participants
performed trials for a range of incentives (i.e., $0, $5, $25, $50,
$75, $100) and at two difficulty levels (easy and hard).
RESULTS
Behavioral and Neural Responses
Behavioral results from the training phase (Day 1) indicated that
control of the spring-mass system was initially challenging for
participants, but after repeated practice they were able to
increase their performance (Figure 2). In the subsequent
experiment, we found that participants exhibited peak
performance over the range of incentive levels and the bulk of
participants reached peak performance at an incentive level
less than $100 (Figure 3A). This variability in performance
responses for incentives was likely due to participants’ differ-
ences in subjective value for incentives (Ariely et al., 2009). To
account for differences in behavioral performance variance
between participants, each participants’ measures of perfor-
mance were separately standardized (Z-scored) across incen-
tive categories. We computed group statistics on behavioral
responses to incentive using these standardized performance
measures.
To examine participants’ behavioral responses to incentive,
we compared performance at the extremes of incentive with
performance in the middle range of incentives (see the Data
Analysis section for details). At the hard (t(17) = 2.20, p = 0.04)
and combined (t(17) = 2.47, p = 0.02) difficulty levels, and not
the easy level (t(17) = 0.42, p = 0.70), we found that participants
had greater performance in the middle range of incentive as
compared to the extremes of incentive (Figure 3B). We also
found a significant interaction between these incentive cate-
gories and difficulty (F[1,68] = 6.30, p = 0.01). Further dividing
incentive levels (Figure 3C), we found significant main effects
of incentive on performance in the hard condition (F[2,51] =
5.07, p = 0.01), and not the easy (F[2,51] = 2.27, p = 0.11) or
combined (F[2,51] = 2.10, p = 0.13) conditions. We again found584 Neuron 74, 582–594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.a significant interaction between incen-
tive categories and difficulty (F[2,102] =
3.60, p = 0.03). In the hard level we foundthat participants’ performance improved with increasing incen-
tive level up to a point; beyond this point, further increasing
incentives significantly decreased performance relative to peak
performance (Figure 3C).
Because participants performed this task in the fMRI scanner,
we were able to examine the underlying brain activity involved
in generating their performance responses. Figure 4A shows
that, at the time of incentive presentation, the blood oxygen
level-dependent (BOLD) signal in ventral striatum increased
with the magnitude of incentive (cluster sizes > 100 voxels; right
cluster peak: [x = 12; y = 12; Z = 6], T = 6.51; left cluster peak:
[x = 21; y = 15; Z = 3], T = 5.59). Conversely, we found that
striatal activation during the motor task decreased with respect
to the magnitude of incentive (cluster sizes > 100 voxels; right
cluster peak: [x = 21; y = 9; Z = 9], T = 4.15; left cluster peak:
[x = 18; y = 6; z = 6], Z = 3.89). These results point to a rapid
switching, in the direction of striatal activity, between the
presentation of incentive and subsequent performance of the
motor action. We performed a simulation of our fMRI design to
confirm that the striatal deactivation response was not due to
the BOLD response leaking from the incentive presentation
phase into the motor task phase (Figures S1A and S1B available
online). We also performed an analysis of our data to confirm
that the striatal deactivation was not a physiological artifact
(Figure S1C).
Strikingly, the only brain region commonly active between
the time of incentive presentation (Table S1) and the execution
of the motor task (Table S2) was bilaterally encompassing
ventral striatum (Table S3). Furthermore, additional whole brain
analyses did not reveal any brain regions that were directly
correlated with participants’ parabolic behavioral performance
or interactions between incentive level and task difficulty
(see Supplemental Information for details, Figure S1E). These
analyses provided us with further evidence of the ventral
striatum’s integral role in mediating participants’ responses
during performance for incentives.
The idiosyncratic pattern of striatal activity we observed
(i.e., activation at the time of incentive presentation and
deactivation at the time of action) resembles that reported for
participants experiencing potential monetary gains and losses
(Tom et al., 2007; Yacubian et al., 2006). Tom et al. (2007) found
that ventral striatum was activated by the prospect of gains,
and deactivated by the prospect of losses, and that such
AB
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Figure 3. Behavioral Performance during Scanning
(A) Participants exhibited individual differences in the incentive level at which their performance peaked.
(B) At the hard and combined difficulty levels, and not the easy level, we found that participants had greater performance in the middle range of incentive as
compared to the extremes of incentive.
(C) Dividing incentive levels, at the hard difficulty level, we found that performance improved with increasing incentives up to a point. Further increases in
incentives significantly decreased performance relative to peak performance. Planned comparisons of performance, relative to performance in the middle range
of incentives, found significant decrements at the extremes of incentive for the hard condition (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001). Error bars represent SEM.
See also Figure S2.
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Mechanisms Underlying Performance for Incentivesdeactivation was strongly correlated with a behavioral measure
of loss aversion.
The findings of Tom et al. (2007), in conjunction with our
results, led us to develop a new hypothesis regarding the role
of ventral striatum in mediating performance decrements for
large incentives: deactivation of ventral striatum during motor
action reflects evaluation of the potential loss (of a presumed
gain) that would arise from failure to successfully achieve thetask. Essentially, larger incentives are framed as larger potential
losses, and as these perceived potential losses increase (in the
highest incentive conditions) they are manifested as perfor-
mance decrements. Because this hypothesis is generated in
part from a ‘‘reverse-inference’’ (Poldrack, 2006), we needed
to obtain additional evidence in order to provide direct empir-
ical support. Our hypothesis led to the following predictions:
(1) striatal deactivation at the time of motor action wouldNeuron 74, 582–594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 585
AB
Figure 4. fMRI Results
(A) Activity in ventral striatum was positively
correlated with incentive level at the time of
incentive presentation (x = 12; y = 12; z = 6), and
negatively correlated with incentive level at the
time of the motor task (x = 21; y = 9; z = 9). All
contrasts are significant at p < 0.05, small volume
corrected.
(B) Plots of the correlations between neural
sensitivity and mean corrected performance at
the $100 incentive level (for the combined diffi-
culty) for each participant. Error bars denote SEM.
Participants’ performance was mean corrected
to adjust for differences in overall performance
between participants.
See also Figure S1 and Tables S1, S2, and S3.
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Mechanisms Underlying Performance for Incentivespredict the extent of individuals’ decrements in behavioral
performance; (2) activity in ventral striatum during motor action
would relate to an individual’s behavioral loss aversion (i.e.,
the more loss averse a participant, the greater her ventral stria-
tal deactivation during motor action); and (3) a participant’s
degree of behavioral loss aversion would be predictive of her
propensity to exhibit performance decrements for large incen-
tives, as well as the level of incentive that resulted in peak
performance.
Loss Aversion Predicts Neural Responses to Incentives
To test the first prediction, we examined the extent to which
a participant’s decrease in performance at the highest incentive
level was related to her neural sensitivity to incentive. For this
analysis we performed correlations between participants’
behavioral performance at the $100 incentive level and activity
in the striatum. Neural sensitivity to incentive was defined as
the slope of the relationship between BOLD percent signal
change and incentive level; a positive neural sensitivity corre-
sponded to neural activation, whereas a negative activity was
indicative of deactivation.
In keeping with the first prediction, we found significant
correlations between levels of striatal deactivation at the time
of the motor task and performance decrements at the $100
incentive level (Figure 4B; r = 0.70; p = 0.001). Critically, no sig-
nificant relationship between neural sensitivity and performance
was found at the time of incentive presentation (r = 0.22; p =
0.38). Using a cross-product term in a multiple regression
model, we also found a significant interaction between neural
sensitivity during incentive presentation and the motor task
and performance (statistics for interaction term: t(14) = 4.18;
p = 0.001).586 Neuron 74, 582–594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.To test the second prediction we re-
called a subset of participants (n = 12)
who originally participated in these ex-
periments and tested them on a behav-
ioral loss aversion task. This task was
the same as that used by Tom et al.
(2007), and allowed us to determine a
measure l, indicating how heavily partic-
ipants weighed losses compared togains. This subset of participants was found to have a median
l estimate of 2.09 (interquartile range [IQR] 1.09). These values
of l are similar to those reported in previous studies (Bateman
et al., 2005; Gachter et al., 2007; Tom et al., 2007; Tverskey
and Kahneman, 1992). We found significant correlations
between increasing behavioral loss aversion and striatal
deactivation during motor action (Figure 5A; r = 0.60; p =
0.04; Figure S3). Importantly, we did not find a significant corre-
lation between neural sensitivity during incentive presentation
and participants’ behavioral loss aversion (r = 0.30; p = 0.34).
We also found a significant interaction between neural sensi-
tivity during incentive presentation and the motor task and
loss aversion (statistics for interaction term: t(8) = 2.40 p =
0.05). These results illustrate that differences in behavioral
loss aversion were indicative of neural responses during motor
action.
Loss Aversion Predicts Behavioral Responses
to Incentives
To test the third prediction, and to reach an adequate sample
size to test behavioral correlations, we included an additional
20 participants who performed the motor task, the behavioral
loss aversion task, and a risk aversion task outside the fMRI
scanner. A group comprised of both the subset of imaging
participants (n = 12), and the additional participants (n = 20)
had a median l estimate of 2.10 (IQR 0.85). We found a highly
significant (r = 0.53; p = 0.002) relationship between increasing
behavioral loss aversion and the proclivity to show perfor-
mance decrements in the hard difficulty level (Figure 5B), but
not in the easy difficulty level (r = 0.22; p = 0.23). We also found
a significant relationship (r = 0.36; p = 0.04) between
decreasing behavioral loss aversion and the level of incentive
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Figure 5. Loss Aversion across Participants
(A) The correlation between behavioral loss aver-
sion for each participant and their neural sensitivity
to incentive (at the time of themotor task). A robust
regression revealed that a candidate outlier did
not have an impact on the correlation between
neural sensitivity and loss aversion. This candidate
outlier was not in fact an outlier as it was within
2 SD of themean (l = 0.94; groupmean ± 2*SD, l =
2.22 ± 1.44). We also performed an additional
fMRI study that duplicated the relationship
between neural sensitivity and loss aversion. See
also Figure S3.
(B and C) Plots of the correlations between (B)
behavioral loss aversion and mean corrected
behavioral performance at the $100 incentive level
(for the hard difficulty level) (C), and incentive
resulting in peak performance (for the hard diffi-
culty level) (C). Plots (B) and (C) contain data from
the initial (n = 12) and the follow-up (n = 20)
experiments.
(D) Behavioral performance from the follow-up
experiment (n = 20, for the hard difficulty level). For
this analysis we separated participants into tertiles
based on the extent of their loss aversion. We
found a main effect of incentive in the lower
(F[2,18] = 5.38, p = 0.02) and upper (F[2,18] = 4.29,
p = 0.04) tertile of loss aversion. Planned
comparisons of performance, relative to perfor-
mance in the middle range of incentives, found
significant decrements (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01) at the
extremes of incentive for participants in the upper
tertile and not in the lower tertile. Error bars
represent SEM.
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Mechanisms Underlying Performance for Incentivesresulting in peak behavioral performance in the hard difficulty
level (Figure 5C), but not in the easy difficulty level (r = 0.24;
p = 0.19). Those participants with greater behavioral loss aver-
sion exhibited peak performance at lower incentive levels and
more impaired performance for high incentives. The additional
group of participants (n = 20) exhibited a wide range of l’s and
separating these participants based on the degree of their loss
aversion, we found that those that were less loss averse
followed a monotonic response to incentives, whereas more
loss averse participants exhibited the paradoxical response to
incentives (Figure 5D). These results provide evidence that
participants frame their performance for incentives, duringNeuron 74, 582–highly skilled tasks, in terms of the loss
of a presumed gain that would arise
from failure. Moreover, this encoding of
loss aversion drives participants’ behav-
ioral performance for incentive.
Loss aversion represents a tendency to
value lossesgreater thanequalmagnitude
gains. Risk aversion, on the other hand,
is a more general aversion to increased
variance in potential gains or losses. To
ensure a loss aversion-based hypothesis
and not a general aversion to risk was
responsible for our findings, we hadparticipants in the follow-up experiment (n = 20) perform another
decision-making task inwhich theymade choices regarding risky
gambles that did not include potential losses. Using participants’
responses from this task we were able to calculate a measure
a that represented their risk aversion. Participants had a median
a estimate of 0.83 (IQR0.20), indicating that theywere on average
risk averse. Importantly, no significant correlations were found
between our behavioral measures of performance and risk aver-
sion (Table 1). This provides further evidence that an individual’s
incentive resulting in peak performance and her performance
decrements for large incentives are due specifically to loss
aversion.594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 587
Table 1. Correlations between Prospect Theory Parameters and Performance for Participants in the Follow-Up Experiment
Correlation with Loss Aversion (l); n = 20 Correlation with Risk Aversion (a); n = 20
Performance
at $100
Incentive Resulting
in Peak Performance
Performance
at $100
Incentive Resulting
in Peak Performance
Easy difficulty r = 0.31 r = 0.26 r = 0.17 r = 0.22
p = 0.18 p = 0.27 p = 0.47 p = 0.35
Hard difficulty r = 0.61 r = 0.44 r = 0.18 r = 0.10
p = 0.004 p = 0.05 p = 0.45 p = 0.67
Each element of this table indicates the significance of a correlation between participants’ loss aversion and risk aversion and performance measures
at each difficulty level.
Neuron
Mechanisms Underlying Performance for IncentivesA Prediction Error Model Does Not Describe Neural
Responses to Incentives
Given that the striatum is also known to encode signals resem-
bling a rewarded prediction error (McClure et al., 2003; O’Doh-
erty et al., 2003; Pagnoni et al., 2002), we performed a simulation
to determine if the deactivations observed during the motor task
could be elicited as a byproduct of prediction error signaling. For
this analysis we considered a temporal difference (TD) model of
prediction error (PE), where a prediction error d was generated
from a difference between a predicted value V(t) at time t and
a predicted value V(t + 1) at time t + 1 (Sutton and Barto, 1990):
d=Vðt + 1Þ  VðtÞ:
In our experiment, participants trained the day before the re-
warded portion of the experiment and thus generated an expec-
tation of their probability of success given a presented target
size, and an average probability of success over all trials. We
will assume that participants had, through training, learned the
probability of success on easy trials Peasy = 0.80, and on hard
trials Phard = 0.60. Therefore, on average Pcombined = 0.70. With
these probabilities of success we can generate the PE signals
that would occur through the course of a trial and examine if
these PEs match our neural data.
At the beginning of a trial the predicted reward V(t0) is zero
for each time t until the time of incentive presentation tpresentation.
The initial presentation of incentive results in a positive prediction
error d = Pcombined*V(tpresentation)  0. At tpresentation participants
are not given any cues regarding trial difficulty, therefore their
probability of success is Pcombined. These expectations result in
positive prediction errors that increase with the magnitude of
the incentive offered (Figure 6B). It can be seen that this PE
response mirrors the striatal activations we observed during
incentive presentation.
When the motor task begins at tmotor, participants update
their prediction error depending on the difficulty of the trial:
easy trials d = Peasy*V(tmotor) Pcombined*V(tpresentation); hard trials
d = Phard*V(tmotor)  Pcombined*V(tpresentation). This results in
different PE responses for the different trial difficulties (Fig-
ure 6C). Easy trials result in positive PEs that scale with the
magnitude of the incentive, whereas hard trials result in negative
PEs that also scale with the magnitude of incentive.
Predicted PE responses for hard trials mimic our observed
responses in striatum, however striatal responses for easy and
combined trials do not align with the predictions of the PEmodel.
Instead, we see that observed responses for easy trials are588 Neuron 74, 582–594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.exactly opposite those of the PEmodel (Figure S4). Furthermore,
observed responses for the combined trials show deactivation,
whereas the model predicts no PE response. Overall, the results
of our simulation illustrate that a TD PE model is not sufficient
to describe our observed neural responses to incentives.
One might also consider a modified version of the PE model
that incorporates a loss aversion parameter such that negative
prediction errors loom larger than positive prediction errors.
However, such a revised PE model still does not capture the
pattern of deactivations observed in the easy condition of our
current task.
Brain Regions Showing an Interaction between Task
Performance and Incentive
To examine differences in brain activity as a function of unsuc-
cessful versus successful performance, we contrasted unsuc-
cessful and successful trials at the time of the motor task. We
also examined an interaction between performance (i.e., unsuc-
cessful and successful trials) and incentive level. We found no
significant main effect of task performance. However, we did
find a significant interaction between performance and incentive
in the ventral striatum (Figure 7; Table S4), such that this region
showed a greater deactivation as a function of incentive during
unsuccessful trials compared to successful trials (cluster sizes
> 100 voxels; right cluster peak: [x = 27; y = 0; Z = 0], T = 6.96;
left cluster peak: [x = 27; y = 3; Z = 3], T = 5.05). This region
overlapped with the portion of the ventral striatum we found to
be positively correlated with incentive at the time of incentive
presentation and negatively correlated with incentive during
themotor task (Figure S5). No other brain region showed a signif-
icant effect in this contrast (Table S4).
The finding of a similar pattern of deactivation in the striatum
during unsuccessful and successful trials suggests that on all
trials participants evaluate the prospect of losing. This loss
aversion is manifested irrespective of participants’ confidence
about the likelihood of success as their motor execution prog-
resses on successful trials, and irrespective of the eventual
outcome of a particular trial.
DISCUSSION
Our results provide insights into the potential contribution of the
ventral striatum in mediating the interaction between incentives
and behavioral performance. At the time of incentive presenta-
tion increased incentives result in striatal activation. This striatal
AB
C
Figure 6. A Prediction Error Model Does Not Describe Neural
Responses to Incentives
(A) We simulated prediction error (PE) signals at the time of incentive
presentation and the time of motor task execution.
(B) At the time of incentive presentation the PE model is in correspondence
with observed striatal activations.
(C) At the time of the motor task the PE model predicts positive prediction
errors for easy trials, negative predictions errors for hard trials, and no
prediction errors for combined difficulty. We observe striatal deactivations in
easy, hard, and combined trials. Observed percent signal change data were
extracted from average voxel activity in a ventral striatal ROI in contrasts for
easy, hard, and combined difficulty conditions.
See also Figure S4.
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Mechanisms Underlying Performance for Incentivesactivation is consistent with a wealth of evidence showing that
the striatum encodes a motivational signal associated with the
size of a potential reward (Breiter et al., 2001; Elliott et al.,
2003; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Tom et al., 2007). However, we
find that during task execution the same portion of striatum
deactivates in manner that is indicative of loss aversion and
eventual performance decrements. It is also important to note
that these findings are not confounded by differences in behav-
ioral performance between conditions, because the reported
fMRI results are based on trials in which the motor act was ulti-
mately successfully performed. Furthermore, a careful analysis
of participants’ movement trajectories yielded no significant
differences in a variety of kinematic measures as a function ofincentive level on successful trials (Figure S2). This indicates
that basic differences in the pattern of elicited motor behavior
cannot explain the observed fMRI results.
A recent imaging study found decreases in behavioral perfor-
mance and increases in midbrain activity in response to a large
incentive (Mobbs et al., 2009). The authors interpreted this
response as an ‘‘over motivation’’ signal for the high reward
associated with successful task performance. Here we show
that ‘‘arousal’’ or overmotivation is unlikely to be a complete
account for such performance decrements. The increasing posi-
tive responses we observed in striatum (that could be related to
arousal [Cooper and Knutson, 2008]), at the time of incentive
presentation, were not correlated with performance decrements.
Instead, only the decreasing activity observed during actual
motor action correlated with these decrements in performance.
Furthermore, loss aversion and not other arousal provoking
behavioral tendencies, such as risk-aversion (Lo and Repin,
2002), were found to be correlated with performance decre-
ments and striatal deactivation during motor action. Although
the Mobbs et al. (2009) study did not implicate ventral striatum
in the choking effect, instead identifying midbrain and dorsal
striatum, it is important to note that their study differed from
ours in the manner in which incentives were delivered. In our
study actual monetary rewards were only delivered at the end
of the experiment, whereas in the Mobbs et al. (2009) study,
incentives were accrued after every trial. Such differences in
experimental design could potentially account for the different
pattern of results.
One plausible mechanistic account of our findings relates to
a long hypothesized role for the ventral striatumas a limbic-motor
interface-mediating interactions between systems for Pavlovian
valuation and instrumental responding (Alexander et al., 1990;
Balleine, 2005; Cardinal et al., 2002; Mogenson et al., 1980).
Whereas previous literature has focused on the role of the ventral
striatum in mediating the effect of reward-predicting cues in
increasing or enhancing instrumental performance for reward,
our findings also point to a potential contribution of this region
in performance decrements. In our experiment it is likely that,
during motor performance, the prospect of losing elicits partici-
pants’ aversive Pavlovian conditioned responses (Dayan and
Seymour, 2008). These aversive responses could include motor
withdrawal and avoidance, as well as engagement of attention
or orienting mechanisms away from the task. At the level of
motor execution, competing aversive Pavlovian responses
could interfere with the motor commands necessary for suc-
cessful execution of skilled instrumental responses.
The main output pathway of the ventral striatum is via the
ventral pallidum (Graybiel, 2000; Grillner et al., 2005; Groenewe-
gen, 2003). The ventral pallidum projects to the thalamus, which,
in turn, sends motor signals to cortical areas (Graybiel, 2000;
Grillner et al., 2005; Groenewegen, 2003). The ventral striatum
also sends direct projections to brainstem areas such as the
pedunculopontine nucleus, which is implicated in voluntary
motor control (Lavoie and Parent, 1994; Mena-Segovia et al.,
2004; Semba and Fibiger, 1992). Accordingly, it is possible
that interference of the motor system from a ventral striatal moti-
vation signal could occur either at the level of the cortex or the
brainstem. Considerable further work will be needed to establishNeuron 74, 582–594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 589
Figure 7. Interaction between Task Performance and Incentive
Level
This contrast illustrates brain regions, at the time of the motor task, that
showed a greater deactivation as a function of incentive level on unsuc-
cessful compared to successful trials (contrast: [unsuccessful ($0, $5, $25,
$50, $100)]  [successful ($0, $5, $25, $50, $100)]. Ventral striatum [x = 27;
y = 0; z = 0], significant at p < 0.05, small volume corrected. Error bars
represent SEM.
See also Figure S5 and Table S4.
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Mechanisms Underlying Performance for Incentiveshow ventral striatal signals come to act on the motor system,
both in the domains of performance increments and perfor-
mance decrements.
Our findings also have implications for other psychological
explanations of choking effects. As noted above, according to
the loss aversion theory, participants will likely engage mecha-
nisms associated with being in an aversive state. This could
include allocation of attentional resources away from the task.
In this sense divergence of attention may provide a potential
role in modulating performance. However, we did not find
evidence of behavioral decrements correlating with the fronto-
parietal attention network (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002), as
might be predicted by attentional theories. Although this does
not completely rule out the role of attention in the phenomenon,
such effects (if present) appear not to be mediated by brain
systems typically implicated in controlling attention.
Explicit monitoring theories suggest that performance decre-
ments can be caused by the transfer of behavioral control from
an automatized habit system to a goal-directed deliberative
system (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock and Carr, 2001; Beilock
et al., 2004; Langer and Imber, 1979). Considerable progress
has been made in identifying brain systems involved in goal-
directed and habitual control, with the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex and anterior dorsal striatum implicated in the former,
and the posterolateral striatum implicated in the latter (Balleine
and Dickinson, 1998; Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Corbit and
Balleine, 2003; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; Valentin et al.,
2007; Yin et al., 2004, 2005). Although our ventral striatal findings
are consistent with the possibility of interactions between
Pavlovian and instrumental control systems, the absence of
any correlations between performance decrements and activity
in brain systems known to be involved in goal-directed or
habitual control do not lend support for the explicit monitoring
theory (at least in relation to the present study).
It is also important to note that although our present findings
support the role of aversion-related mechanisms in performance
decrements, we cannot rule out possible contributions of590 Neuron 74, 582–594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.additional maliferous mechanisms in mediating performance
decrements under other task conditions or contexts. It remains
an open question whether similar mechanisms play a role in
driving performance decrements in the presence of stressors
other than large incentives, such as audience effects or com-
petition. It is entirely possible that no single mechanism will
account for all instances of the choking effect.
Our findings in the striatum also have implications for
economic theories of choice. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) have
suggested that we do not define our reference point for the value
of decisions and actions in the absolute terms specified by the
environment; instead we set an internal reference point based
on our expectations of a task outcome. The rapid switching of
ventral striatum, and loss sensitivity at the time of motor action
that we have shown here, suggests that the ventral striatum
might play a role in encoding such an endogenous reference
point. In a sense, when participants see they are playing for
$100, they view this money as being endowed to them and theirs
to lose. When they actually perform the task, their loss aversion
is revealed and manifested as decrements in performance.
Two recent behavioral economics studies postulate that refer-
ence dependent utility could influence performance decrements
in the context of professional athletics. In one of these studies
the authors examined millions of putts from professional golfers
and suggested that the par score of a hole served as a reference
point for players; with putts being less accurate when attempting
shots below par (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011). Another study
examined penalty kick shootouts of soccer games (Apesteguia
and Palacios, 2010). This study proposed that the score of the
shootout served as a player’s reference point and leading or
lagging in score had an influence on performance; with those
lagging in score performing worse than those leading. These
studies provide interesting insights into the possibility of an
endogenous reference point of value influencing skilled task
performance. However, these hypotheses are difficult to gener-
alize because the contexts in which the sports are played are
highly variable and the data lack a degree of experimental
control. Furthermore, it was impossible to directly isolate
players’ endogenous reference point of value because psycho-
logical and physiological measures were not available in these
data sets. Instead, these studies only infer possible mechanisms
used to define reference points during task performance.
Our study provides direct behavioral and neural evidence of
the mechanism responsible for encoding an endogenous refer-
ence point during skilled task performance for incentives. It is
important to realize that the hypothesis of a reference dependent
encoding of value, and exactly how this reference point is
defined, was informed and driven by our initial imaging analysis
(experiment 1). Without this fMRI analysis, one would simply
expect, as we did initially, that increasing incentives for task
performance are encoded solely as increasing potential gains.
In contrast, our fMRI analysis informed the hypothesis that the
brain encodes increasing potential gains when the amount of
incentive is initially presented, however when actually perform-
ing the task potential gains are reframed in terms of losses.
This neurally informed hypothesis was confirmed using a sepa-
rate experiment (experiment 2) in which we related a behavioral
measure of loss aversion to task performance. In this way we
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ing an endogenous reference point of value, and shed light on
how it influences skilled task performance. This study highlights
how neuroscience methods can provide insights of economic
behavior: one of the major goals of the burgeoning field of
neuroeconomics.
Economists have long pondered the question of how best to
design incentive contracts that pay workers just enough to fully
maximize their performance (Smith, 1776). Standard models of
these contracts assume that both the principal (manager) and
agent (worker) act rationally and in a fashion that maximizes their
individual utility (Laffont and Martimort, 2001). Under this
assumption it follows that a worker’s performance should
monotonically increase with pay. The results of our study illus-
trate that performance responses to incentives are far more
nuanced, and beyond the fine balance between performance
and pay are loss aversion and detrimental performance effects.
Our findings also have implications for understanding the
nature of performance decrements in situations where skilled
motor acts need to be performed under conditions of high
stakes, such as in sporting competitions (Jordet and Hartmen,
2008; Smith et al., 2003), or even in life and death situations
such as surgery or the operation of machinery in hazardous
environments. We have shown that people with less striatal
sensitivity to incentive (i.e., the most stable neural response
over the range of incentives) perform high stakes tasks with
more proficiency. With this in mind, it is plausible that the imple-
mentation of explicit cognitive strategies designed to focus an in-
dividual away from the prospect of failure could serve to stabilize
neural activity and mitigate potential performance decrements.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Experimental Setup
Stimulus presentation and behavioral data acquisition were achieved using
custom designed MATLAB (http://www.mathworks.com) and C++ programs
implementing the OpenGL (Silicon Graphics) graphics libraries. During func-
tional magnetic resonance (fMRI), visual feedback of targets and hand position
were presented via a projector positioned at the back of the room. Participants
viewed a reflection of the projector image (800 3 600 pixels) in a mirror
attached to the scanner head coil. This system allowed us to generate virtual
images and manipulate visual feedback.
Direct view of the arm was obscured because participants were positioned
in the scanner head-first-supine, and the display mirror blocked their view. A
Vicon motion tracking system (MX Ultranet system, with 4 MX40+ cameras;
Oxford Metrics, Oxford, UK) was used to record the motion of an infrared
reflective maker attached to the right index finger. During experiments, these
signals were sent to our custom designed software for visual real-time feed-
back of participants’ hand position. The position signals were also recorded
for further offline analysis. Participants’ arm movements were confined to
the coronal plane, and visual feedback of these movements was presented
in 2D on the visual display.
Experimental Procedures
Participants
All participants were right handed, and were prescreened to exclude those
with a prior history of neurological or psychiatric illness. The California Institute
of Technology Institutional Review Board approved this study, and all partici-
pants gave informed consent.
Eighteen participants (mean age, 26; age range, 19–35; seven females) took
part in the first experiment (experiment 1). Of these 18 participants 12 returned
for a subsequent test of behavioral loss aversion.For the follow-up experiment (experiment 2), an additional 20 participants
were recruited (mean age, 23; age range, 19–30; nine females), however,
they did not perform the experiment in the fMRI scanner. They performed
the motor task in a mock scanning environment to duplicate the postural
constraints of the actual scanner. They also performed loss aversion and
risk aversion tasks.
Motor Task
The experiment was comprised of three phases that took place on two
consecutive days. On the first day, participants practiced control of the
spring-mass system (training phase). For a more detailed description of the
spring-mass system see the Supplemental Information. After the training
phase, we determined participants’ rates of success at various target sizes
(thresholding phase). On the second day, participants controlled the spring-
mass system with the purpose of obtaining reward (testing phase). Both the
training and thresholding phases took place in a mock scanner to replicate
the posture necessary in the scanning environment. The testing phase took
place in the fMRI scanner. Prior to the experiment, participants were told
they would receive a show-up fee of $40 dollars, and that at the end of the
experiment one trial would be randomly selected from the testing phase and
a payment made according to their actual performance on that trial. This is
a standard procedure used in behavioral economics, which ensures that
participants evaluate each trial independently.
The training phase was comprised of 500 trials. A trial began when a partic-
ipant put her hand cursor over the start position and ended after 2 s. At the end
of the trial, the cursors flashed green if the scoring criteria were met and red
otherwise. The target size was 502 mm throughout the training phase. The
thresholding phase was the same as the training in all respects, except that
it was comprised of 200 trials of varying size. Target sizes ranged from 102
mm to 552 mm in increments of 52 mm. Each target size was randomly
presented 20 times. From this data we obtained a psychometric curve that
represented participants’ performance over a range of target sizes.
Finally, during the testing phase participants were scanned with fMRI while
controlling the spring-mass system for reward. Participants performed trials
for a range of incentives (i.e., $0, $5, $25, $50, $75, $100) and at two difficulty
levels (i.e., easy, hard). The difficulty levels were tailored to each participant
using their respective psychometric curves. The easy level corresponded to
the target size at which participants have an 80% success rate, and hard coin-
cided with a 60% success rate. Each treatment was randomly presented 25
times for a total of 300 trials. At the beginning of each trial, participants were
shown a message indicating the amount of incentive they were playing for
(e.g., Win $50) (jittered duration 2–5 s). They then performed the motor task,
with the same success criteria as before (duration 2 s), andwere shown the trial
outcome (1 s). At the end of the experiment a single trial was selected at
random and the participant was paid based on performance on that trial.
Loss Aversion Task
This task was performed outside the fMRI scanner. Participants received an
initial endowment of $40 in cash (this amount was separate from their show-
up fee) and were told that at the end of the experiment one trial would be
randomly selected and a payment made according to their actual decision
during the experiment. Participants were told that their $40 endowment was
given to them so that they could pay any eventual losses at the end of the
experiment. Any net amount from the endowment that remained after sub-
tracting a loss was theirs to keep, and similarly any eventual gain earned in
the experiment was added on top of the initial endowment.
The experiment consisted of 512 trials. During the task participants were
asked to accept or reject a series of mixed gambles with equal (50%) proba-
bility of winning or losing a variable amount of money. These gambles were
presented on a computer screen as the prospective outcomes of a coin flip,
and participants indicated their willingness to take the gamble by key press.
Trials were self-paced. Each trial was uniquely and randomly sampled from
a gains/losses matrix with potential gains ranging from +$10 to +$40 and
potential losses from $5 to $20 in increments of $2. This task is the same
as that used by Tom et al. (2007).
Risk Aversion Task
Participants were also tested on their general risk attitude (independent from
loss aversion) using a series of monetary gambles that included only gains.
In each trial, each participant was presented with the choice either to acceptNeuron 74, 582–594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 591
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(i.e., flip a coin to receive a larger amount of money or get nothing). The sure
amount was either $10, $15, or $20. Corresponding gambles ranged from
$16 to $27, $26 to $37, and $36 to $47 respectively (in increments of $1).
Each trial was presented six times (216 trials in total) in random order. At the
end of the experiment a trial was randomly selected and a payment was
made according to the participants’ decision and a random outcome. This is
an adaption of the risk task developed by Holt and Laury (2002).
MRI Protocol
A 3 Tesla Siemens Trio (Erlangen, Germany) scanner and standard radio
frequency coil was used for all theMR scanning sessions. To reduce the possi-
bility of head movement related artifact, participants’ heads were securely
positioned with foam position pillows. High resolution structural images
were collected using a standard MPRAGE pulse sequence, providing full brain
coverage at a resolution of 1 mm 3 1 mm 3 1 mm. Functional images were
collected at an angle of 30 from the anterior commissure-posterior commis-
sure (AC-PC) axis, which reduced signal dropout in the orbitofrontal cortex
(Deichmann et al., 2003). Forty-five slices were acquired at a resolution of
3 mm 3 3 mm 3 3 mm, providing whole-brain coverage. A one-shot echo-
planar imaging (EPI) pulse sequence was used (TR = 2800 ms, TE = 30 ms,
FOV = 100 mm, flip angle = 80).
Data Analysis
Behavioral Performance Analysis
To account for differences in behavioral performance variance between partic-
ipants (which contributed to extraneous variance in the aggregate data) we
Z-scored participants’ performance measurements. To do this, each partici-
pants’ measures of performance were separately standardized (Z-scored)
across incentive categories. Z-scoring was achieved by taking a performance
level in an incentive category and subtracting it from themean performance for
all incentive categories divided by the standard deviation. This preserved the
relative ordering of performance levels across incentives. Z-scoring is a widely
used method for normalizing ratings data between subjects that provides
a standard performance scale over which to evaluate group behavioral data
(Martin and Bateson, 1993).
Due to differences in participants’ subjective value for monetary incentives,
participants exhibited peak performance over the range of incentive levels
(Figure 3B) (Ariely et al., 2009), therefore averaging performance at the
presented incentive bins would attenuate the effect of peaked responses to
incentives. To illustrate that group performance peaked and then dropped
with increasing incentives, we classified the presented incentives as either
being at the extremes of incentives or in the middle range of incentives.
Rewards in the middle range of incentives were classified as those between
5% and 95% of the range of incentives (middle range of incentives: [$25,
$50, $75]), while rewards at the extremes of incentive were those outside
this range (low extreme: [$0, $5]; high extreme: [$100]).
To ensure that the results we obtained from our Z-scored performance
data were not an artifact of our normalization approach, we simulated
10,000 experiments each comprised of 18 subjects (the number of subjects
in our fMRI data set) wherein performance levels were sampled from a normal
distribution (mean = 70%, std = 10%). When performing a t test comparing the
Z-scored performance at the extremes of incentive ($0, $5, $100) with the
middle range of incentive ($25, $50, $75) we found that significance was
reached at the 5% level in less than 3% of simulations as would be expected
for an unbiased sample at the 5% significance level. Furthermore, in a subse-
quent analysis we found that 0 out of 10,000 of these simulations resulted in
a significant ANOVA at p < 0.05 and significant increases and decreases in
Z-scored performance across three incentive categories (low: $0,$5; medium:
$25, $50, $75; high: $100).
Image Processing and fMRI Statistical Analysis
The SPM5 software package was used to analyze the fMRI data (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). A
slice-timing correction was applied to the functional images to adjust for the
fact that different slices within each image were acquired at slightly different
points in time. Images were corrected for participant motion, spatially trans-
formed to match a standard echo-planar imaging template brain, and
smoothed using a 3DGaussian kernel (6mmFWHM) to account for anatomical592 Neuron 74, 582–594, May 10, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.differences between participants. This set of data was then analyzed
statistically.
The general linear model (GLM) was used to generate voxelwise statistical
parametric maps (SPMs) from the fMRI data. To generate the results pre-
sented in the main text we created a GLM that included categorical events
at the time of incentive presentation and separate events for each combina-
tion of motor task conditions (incentive level, difficulty, performance). The
incentive presentation event was modeled with a duration lasting the length
of incentive presentation (2–5 s), whereas the motor task event was modeled
with a fixed duration of 2 s. Because there were six incentive levels ($0, $5,
$25, $50, $75, $100), two difficulty levels (easy, hard), and two performance
outcomes (successful, unsuccessful), this resulted in 24 categorical events
to model all condition combinations of the motor task. Including the incentive
presentation event, a grand total of 25 categorical events were modeled. We
also included incentive level as a parametric modulator at the time of the
incentive presentation event. In addition, regressors modeling the head
motion as derived from the affine part of the realignment produce were
included in the model.
With this model we tested brain areas in which activity was correlated with
incentive level at the time of incentive presentation. This was done by creating
contrasts with the aforementioned parametric modulator for incentive at the
time of incentive presentation. We also examined areas in which activity
was correlated with incentive level at the time of the motor task. This was
done by creating linear contrasts for the motor task conditions at the varying
incentive levels (separated among difficulty levels and performance
outcomes). To increase statistical power these contrasts (Figure 4) were
computed for trials collapsed across difficulty levels; and to control for actual
performance they were computed for only those trials in which participants
were successful.
We created a separate GLM to test for differences in brain activity between
performance outcomes (i.e., unsuccessful and successful trials) during the
motor task, and activity showing an interaction between incentives and perfor-
mance during the motor task. This model included a categorical event at the
time of incentive presentation and separate events at the time of the motor
task for unsuccessful and successful trials. Each of these categorical regres-
sors included a parametric modulator corresponding to the level of incentive
presented. The main effect regressors for unsuccessful and successful trials
were subtracted to create contrasts showing the differences between
successful and unsuccessful trials. To create the interaction contrast (Figure 7)
we subtracted the incentive parametric modulators, at the time of the motor
task, for unsuccessful and successful trials.
Analysis of Behavioral Loss Aversion Data
To estimate participants’ loss aversion we used a parametric analysis. We ex-
pressed participants’ utility function u for monetary values x as
uðxÞ=

x xR0
lx x<0
:
This formulation is similar to that introduced by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), except we assumed that u(x) was piece-wise linear over the range of
potential gains and losses presented to participants (an assumption that is
commonly employed [Frydman et al., 2011; Gachter et al., 2007; Tom et al.,
2007]). In this formulation, l represents the relative weighting of losses to
gains, and l > 1 indicates that losses loom larger than equal-sized gains.
Assuming participants combine probabilities and utilities linearly the ex-
pected utility of a mixed gamble can be written as U(G, L) = 0.5 G + 0.5 lL,
where G and L are the respective gain and loss of a presented risky option.
The probability that a participant chooses to make a gamble is given by the
softmax function
PðG;LÞ= 1
1+ expð  tUðG; LÞÞ;
where t is a temperature parameter representing the stochasticity of a partic-
ipant’s choice (t = 0 means choices are random).
We usedmaximum likelihood to estimate parameters l and t for each partic-
ipant, using 512 trials of mixed gambles (G,L) with participant response y ˛
{0,1}. Here y = 1 indicates that the participant chose to make a gamble. This
estimation was performed by maximizing the likelihood function
Neuron
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k = 1
yi logðPðG; LÞÞ+ ð1 yiÞ logð1 PðG; LÞÞ
using Nelder-Meas Simplex Method in Matlab 2008b.
Median parameter estimates for experiment 1 (n = 12) were l = 2.09 (IQR
1.09) and t = 0.70 (IQR 0.27). Median parameter estimates for experiment 2
(n = 20) were l = 2.20 (IQR 0.75) and t = 0.60 (IQR 0.44).
Analysis of Behavioral Risk Aversion Data
Because participants’ risk aversion was tested using a separate set of behav-
ioral choices we used a separate parametric analysis for estimation. The risk
aversion task only included potential gains x, and we expressed participants’
utility u as
uðxÞ= xa xR0:
This formulation is from prospect theory and is commonly used to charac-
terize utility in the gain domain (Tverskey and Kahneman, 1992). It captures
participants decreasing sensitivity to potential gains as the magnitude of gains
increases. The parameter a represents the degree of a participants’ risk aver-
sion (a = 1 characterizes risk neutrality; a < 1 risk aversion; a > 1 risk seeking
behavior).
A participants’ difference in expected utility for mixed gambles comprised of
a risky option (G,0) and a sure option S is expressed as U(G, S) = 0.5 Ga  Sa.
The probability that a participant chose to make a gamble is
PðG;SÞ= 1
1+expð  tUðG;SÞ:
As in the case of the loss aversion data, we used numerical optimization to
estimate the parameters a and t for each participant by maximizing the likeli-
hood function
X216
i = 1
yi logðPðG;SÞÞ+ ð1 yiÞ logð1 PðG;SÞÞ:
Median parameter estimates for experiment 2 (n = 20) were a = 0.83 (IQR
0.20) and t = 2.46 (IQR 1.70). Risk aversion was not estimated for participants
in experiment 1 because they did not perform the risk aversion task.
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